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More Evidence of the Nevada Effect: 
SEC, DOJ, FBI, and IRS Regulatory Enforcement Actions 
 
A.J. Cataldo II 
Lori Fuller 
Thomas Miller* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nevada effect was introduced by Cataldo, Fuller and Miller (2014; CFM hereafter) 
upon further examination of the data in Messier, Kozloski and Kochetova-Kozloski’s (2010) 
published work as well as the entire population of 2012 SEC trading suspensions.  The Nevada 
Effect is characterized as the over representation of firms who chose to incorporate in Nevada 
with respect to the number of SEC trading suspensions and underrepresentation of audits on 
those Nevada corporations by the Big 4 audit firms (who audit nearly 58% of all U.S. publicly 
traded companies). The current research extends the investigations of the Nevada Effect.  
  A study and examination of the relevant literature stream produces compelling evidence 
that there is a market for corporate law; where states compete for the fees associated with 
incorporation. The market share leaders and focus of the present study remain Delaware and 
Nevada.  Academic studies have investigated and forensically examined the impact of Delaware 
and Nevada corporate law (Cary 1974; Winter 1977; Romano 1993; Daines 2001; Abramowicz 
2003; Bebchuk and Cohen 2003; Easmunt 2004; Barzuza 2011; and Barzuza and Smith 2012) 
and Nevada’s increased share of the market. 
In this article, we extend our body of knowledge on the Nevada Effect by examining 17 
SEC suspensions made in June 2011 as well as 14 arrests made through a combined Department 
of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)  
_________________________ 
*The authors are, respectively, Professor, Associate Professor, and Assistant Professor at West 
Chester University. 
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operation; which concluded in 2013. Neither of these investigations was previously examined in 
CFM (2014).  These targeted SEC suspensions and arrests are rare, typically occurring less than 
once per calendar year, and the 2013 arrests sample provides direct dollar value estimates for 
funds lost by investors, the data of which is rare and difficult to obtain.  Continued analysis of 
these targeted government actions is critical in understanding the temporal consistency of the 
Nevada Effect, and an important extension to the work started in CFM (2014).  Our exploration 
found, in both instances, that Nevada firms disproportionately represented the targets of these 
regulatory actions.  Since these samples are being externally generated by government agencies 
they contain no selection bias. 
We further our investigation into the Nevada Effect by forensically developing and 
presenting information as well as providing insights into the promotional efforts, practices, and 
revenues associated with penny stocks
1
.  Nevada corporations dominate pump and dump 
promotional campaigns.  In this scheme managers hire promoters to generate interest in stocks 
via unsubstantiated claims which entices buyers and inflates the price (the pump).  After the 
stock price is inflated – those with knowledge of the scheme immediately sell their  stock 
positions, typically for huge gains (the dump); thereby driving the price back down which leads 
to heavy losses for the most recent investors.  While this practice is technically illegal, it is the 
state corporate law that influences or governs the liability against these managers.  The Nevada 
Effect contends Nevada state law is, by design, lax in this area and facilitates these behaviors 
(CFM 2014). 
We frame our examination in the context of information asymmetry, market efficiency 
and agency theory.  Examples of favorable stock price reactions and over-reactions are provided 
                                                          
1
 Penny stocks are operationally defined as any stock trading below $5 per share. 
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which appear to result from skillfully planned, cleverly crafted and orchestrated timed electronic 
dissemination of positive information based on both financial fundamentals and non-financial 
information.  We also provide an example of how electronically disseminated non-financial 
information resulted in a correction to inflated stock prices, very quickly and efficiently; but only 
after conditions of information asymmetry were corrected and relevant hidden or private 
information became publicly available. 
Akerlof (1970) illustrates that asymmetric information can lead to economic inefficiency, 
and even destroy an efficient market.  Barzuza (2011) explains that Nevada has produced a 
“shockingly lax” corporate law – which represents a differentiated product – that may create 
competitive pressures and an environment that would be destructive to an efficient market (and 
consistent with Akerlof’s concerns).2  Nevada is motivated by a desire to generate tax revenue in 
the form of corporate filing fees; a condition historically and presently dominated by Delaware. 
In fact Delaware’s revenues are so significant that it has no need for a state sales tax. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: first, we provide a broad description 
and integration of relevant, related components of hidden and private information.  The former is 
associated with agency (or contract) theory and the latter is associated with market efficiency (or 
the efficient market hypothesis).  Both fall under the broader study of information economics and 
information asymmetry.  Second, we summarize and describe two separate regulatory actions 
                                                          
2
 See The Nevada Advantage: Top Reasons to Incorporate in Nevada.  Available at 
<http://nvsos.gov/index.aspx?page=422>, where the Nevada Secretary of State (NVSOS) website lists the reasons 
and/or advantages associated with incorporation in the state of Nevada as including no (1) corporate income tax, (2) 
taxes on corporate shares, (3) franchise tax, (4) personal income tax, (5) franchise tax on income, (6) inheritance or 
gift tax, (7) unitary tax, (8) estate tax, (9) nominal annual fees, (10) Nevada corporations may purchase, hold, sell or 
transfer shares of its own stock, (11) Nevada corporations may issue stock for capital, services, personal property, or 
real estate, including leases and options. The directors may determine the value of any of these transactions, and 
their decision is final, (12) competitive sales and property tax rates, (13) minimal employer payroll tax - 0.7% of 
gross wages with deductions for employer paid health insurance, (14) Nevada's Business Court, and (15) developed 
on the Delaware model, the Business Court in Nevada minimizes the time, cost and risks of commercial litigation 
by: (a) early, comprehensive case management, (b) active judicial participation in settlement, (c) priority for hearing 
settings to avoid business disruption, and (d) predictability of legal decisions in commercial matters. 
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from 2011 and 2013.  Combined, these actions involved the SEC, DOJ, FBI and IRS.  Nevada 
corporations dominated the targets for these regulatory actions and arrests.  Third, we 
statistically examine the impact of an early 2013 promotional scheme involving a Nevada 
corporation.  The promotional efforts appear to have been sophisticated in that they were 
skillfully crafted and carefully coordinated at a variety of levels.  We provide some fundamental 
measures and include a comparable Delaware corporation for comparison and context.  Finally, 
we summarize our findings for academics, professionals and regulatory agencies and encourage 
others to consider alternative approaches, research designs, and continued and expanded 
investigations into the Nevada Effect. 
 
RELEVANT THEORY: 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND HIDDEN AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 
 
In an economic game, the economic actor or player with private information is the 
informed player.  The economic actor or player with only public information and without private 
information is the uninformed player. 
An environment with hidden information is sometimes characterized as one that 
facilitates adverse selection (Cabrales and Charness 2008).  Information has economic value in 
that information available to the informed player produces an incentive to use his or her superior 
information to exploit their information premium. Those facilitating this condition of information 
asymmetry can extract an information rent (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000).    
Adverse selection is pre-contractual.  Moral hazard is post-contractual.  Just as the former 
can be linked with hidden information, the latter is more appropriately associated with hidden 
action.  It is, in this fashion, that we illustrate a framework under conditions of information 
asymmetry that includes both agency theory and market efficiency (see Figure 1). 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
From the managerial accounting and contract theory literature streams, principal-agent 
problems and issues are examined in terms of adverse selection and moral hazard.  To the extent 
that Nevada corporate law facilitates (and/or encourages) information asymmetry, it can attract 
those seeking these features, and they will be willing to pay a premium for the associated value.  
Managerial accounting tends to be associated with internal decision-making. 
From the financial economics and financial accounting literature streams, the efficient 
markets hypothesis and market efficiency is framed in terms of the speed or level of information 
efficiency, where public information is nested within private information, but private information 
might provide an agent with an informational advantage.  Financial accounting tends to be 
associated with external reporting. 
Agents (board of directors and/or management) are monitored by professional or self-
regulatory (e.g., SOX and PCAOB) and regulatory (e.g., FBI, SEC, and the U.S. Attorney or 
DOJ) agencies to protect principals (shareholders and other stakeholders).  In the case of the 
CPA and/or auditor, the auditor accepts the role of the monitor/agent and the board of 
directors/management the role of the principal.  It is possible for the CPA/auditor, as an agent of 
the board of directors/management, to encounter a conflict; where monitoring is not optimized 
with respect to the stockholder’s or principal’s interests. For example consulting (profitable) and 
auditing (less profitable) services performed on the same client were compatible functions. 
However, post-Enron, WorldCom and SOX these functions were found to be incompatible and 
not in the best interest of the stockholder/principle. 
Likewise, financial analysts, underwriters, and broker-dealers may or may not positively 
contribute to the monitoring function.  Underwriting (profitable) and research conducted by 
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financial analysts (less profitable) may be substituted by stock promoters, at least in the lower 
capitalization, small capitalization or micro-cap markets.
3
 
To the extent that Nevada corporate law is designed to favor the agent (management), 
Nevada generates additional corporate filing fees and/or revenues (information asymmetry-based 
economics rents), while disproportionately consuming federal regulatory agency resources (the 
Nevada Effect).  Asymmetric or hidden information and hidden action, by the better informed 
agent, can lead to adverse selection (pre-contraction or pre-purchase of a stock) and moral hazard 
(post-contractual or post-purchase of a stock). 
While Ball and Brown (1968) suggest that financial accounting provides information 
useful to stock market participants, only one eighth of all publicly released information is 
represented by published financial statements (Lev 1989). Christensen (2010, 295-6) refers to 
this finding and points out that accounting information is late by construction and asks why 
regulate accounting information when most of the information action is going on in the non-
regulated regime of other information sources?  As shown below it is in this arena where several 
Nevada firms have found an opportunity for exploitation and exemplify the Nevada Effect. 
 
REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
 
This section describes results from two contemporary Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
Internal Revenues Service (IRS) regulatory enforcement actions occurring in 2011 and 2013, 
respectively.  We provide descriptive measures with a focus on only the state of incorporation 
and, in particular, on the market share leaders - Delaware and Nevada.  Despite the fact that more 
                                                          
3
 Micro cap stocks might be said to be neglected and referred to as generic stocks by traditional financial analysts, 
which is not an issue in the case of big-cap or brand name stocks. 
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than 50% of the publicly traded firms in the U.S. are incorporated in the state of Delaware, 
Nevada corporations were involved in the majority of these regulatory enforcement actions. 
2011 SEC Suspensions 
On June 7, 2011, the SEC suspended trading for 17 Companies, in their proactive effort 
to combat microcap stock fraud (SEC 2011).  Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division 
of Enforcement, included auditors in his list of “gatekeepers”: 
The SEC’s new Microcap Fraud Working Group is targeting the insiders and 
promoters, as well as the transfer agents, attorneys, auditors (emphasis added), 
broker-dealers, and other “gatekeepers” who flourish in the shadows of this less-
than-transparent market. 
 
 “Less-than-transparent” suggests the presence of hidden or private information and could 
also suggest hidden action (see Figure 1).  The Nevada Effect is evident in that the firms 
incorporated in the state of Nevada are disproportionately over-represented and firms 
incorporated in the state of Delaware are disproportionately under-represented in this SEC 
suspension of 17 Companies. 
Table 1 summarizes the firms and state of incorporation, where 59% were incorporated in 
the state of Nevada.  This compares to 8.3% of total US firms incorporated in the state of Nevada 
(see Appendices A & B).  Therefore, Nevada corporations represented more than six times the 
proportion one might anticipate and a disproportionately high percentage of these suspensions.  
Only two of the 10 firms incorporated in the state of Nevada actually operated or headquartered 
their operations in that state. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Only two of the seventeen suspensions, or less than 12%, were for firms incorporated in 
the state of Delaware.  This compares to 54.3% of total US firms incorporated in the state of 
Delaware (see Table 1 and Appendices A & B).  Therefore, Delaware corporations represented 
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less than one-quarter of the proportion one might anticipate and a disproportionately low 
percentage of these suspensions. 
 
2013 DOJ, FBI and IRS Arrests 
On February 14, 2013, the DOJ (U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of 
California) released news of the arrest of 14 individuals and identified the entities involved (FBI 
2013).  The case involved market manipulation and the sale of stock at inflated prices, estimating 
investor losses in excess of $30 million ($11.4 million attributed to Nevada).  Therefore, 38% of 
the illegal proceeds were directly linked to five Nevada corporations (see Table 2).   
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 With only 8.3% of the U.S. firms incorporated in the state of Nevada (see Appendices A 
& B), and 38% of the illegal proceeds from the DOJ arrests involving Nevada corporations, it is 
apparent that a disproportionately high amount of scarce, Federal regulatory resources were 
consumed to identify and make arrests of those associated with these Nevada corporations.   
The fiscal year 2012 budget for the Nevada Secretary of State (NVSOS) Securities 
Division approximated $25.5 million (NVSOS 2012a).  The NVSOS Securities Division is 
responsible for administering the state’s securities law, and their mission is to protect Nevada 
investors from securities fraud by licensing investment professionals, registering securities 
offerings, enforcing the state’s securities law, and educating the public through community 
forums, presentations and the distribution of publications. 
As of June 30, 2012, the Division’s staff totaled 17 full-time employees including seven 
criminal investigators and four compliance audit investigators.  In addition to performing 
securities investigations, the Division’s criminal investigators also conduct corporate filing and 
election fraud related investigations in their capacity as sworn peace officers.  There was no 
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mention of assistance from NVSOS regulatory authorities in the February 14, 2013, news 
release. 
Recall that the estimate of investor losses exceeded the $25.5 million amount for the 
entire NVSOS Securities Division, where estimated investor losses were in excess of $30 
million.  We suggest, based on these measures, that the state of Nevada is free-loading – 
benefitting from the inflow of corporate filing fees or revenues for Nevada’s benefit; while 
relying on Federal regulators and taxpayers/citizens from all other states to participate in bearing 
the costs and resources associated with DOJ, FBI, and IRS regulatory actions. 
In the next section we provide examples of two firms who were involved in pump and 
dump schemes while we were contemporaneously writing our paper. 
 
EXPLORATORY FINDINGS AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
In the Internet age, small and micro-cap stock promotion has become big business.  An 
activity that was relegated to cold-calling in years passed can now be swiftly coordinated and 
executed through websites, email, pop-up ads, and message boards.  This activity is dangerous 
for investors as this promotion is often associated with an illegal scheme known as the pump and 
dump.  In this scheme the promoters make misleading or greatly exaggerated claims about the 
stock when trying to entice buyers.  After the stock price has been inflated the perpetrators of the 
scheme (the promoters themselves or those who hired them) dump their positions in the stock, 
ideally for huge gains, causing the stock price to fall precipitously – leading to heavy losses for 
most new investors.  While this practice is technically illegal, state corporate law influences the 
liability managers have in these cases, and as stated above Nevada state law is by design lax in 
this area. 
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This leads us to an interesting finding we made in the process of examining and 
developing measures for the preceding section.  While conducting a Google search, we identified 
a February 20, 2013, electronic article entitled Seeking Alpha authored by an organization 
referring to itself as the Fraud Research Institute (2013).  Recall that the second fact pattern in 
the preceding section of this paper provided descriptive measures from a February 14, 2013, 
announcement from the DOJ.  Therefore, these public releases occurred within a single week 
 Our attention was directed to an in-process stock promotion for Swingplane Ventures, 
Incorporated (SWVI – a Nevada corporation).  The Seeking Alpha article named 12 other firms 
that illustrate associations and support the author’s position – one of negative investor sentiment 
toward SWVI.  We identified the state of incorporation for SWVI and all other firms mentioned 
in this article.  This information is summarized in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Eleven of the thirteen firms (85%) were Nevada-based.  The high incidence of firms 
incorporated in the state of Nevada was not discussed in the article.  The focus was, instead, on 
two individuals acting as officers and directors of some of these firms, including one barred from 
the securities industry.
 4
  Apparently, these officers and/or directors were roommates operating 
out of a condo in Colorado.  The stock promoter used by SWVI was Awesome Penny Stocks. 
Whether coincidental or causally linked, the Seeking Alpha article was released on 
February 20, 2013, and the stock price per share for SWVI dropped, significantly, at the market 
                                                          
4
 See Securities and Exchange Commission.  (2011). Roundtable on the Execution, Clearance and Settlement of 
Microcap Securities (Monday, October 17).  Available at 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/otherwebcasts/2011/microcaproundtable101711.shtml>, where the primary “red flags” 
drawing the attention of a variety of regulatory agencies include director and officer associates and spouses, 
particularly those already barred from the industry. 
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open on February 21, 2013, the following trading day.
5
  We captured this data, which is 
presented in Figure 2.  While not possible to statistically/causally link the release of this 
electronic Seeking Alpha article, scientifically, to the nearly immediate and significant decline in 
SWVIs stock price, the events are precisely correlated and consistent with Christensen’s (2010) 
hypothesis that accounting information, per se, is not the most significant or relevant information 
used by investors or stock price reactions.  If presumed to be causally linked, the stock price 
reaction is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, where previously hidden or private 
information, once disclosed and made public, reduces the level of information asymmetry.  
StockPromoters.com monitors newsletter activity.
6
  Table 4 lists the 10 most promoted 
penny stocks for the week ended February 24, 2013. 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 here] 
SWVI ranked second in the top ten of the most promoted penny or micro-cap stocks for the 
week.  We investigated the state of incorporation for each of the top 10 firms.  Eight of the top 
10 most promoted stocks are incorporated in the state of Nevada.   
Upon further investigation, 75 (90%) of the 83 newsletters used to promote SWVI were 
from (1) Awesome Penny Stocks, (2) Penny Stock Expert, (3) PennyStocks.com, and (4) Victory 
Stocks.  The headlines and content are comparable for all four of these electronic newsletters, 
where the cost for a single newsletter is disclosed as 10,200 BRL or more than $90,000 for 18 
dates/deliveries (i.e., $5,171 multiplied by 18) by a single promoter. 
                                                          
5
 It should be noted that two other online articles, favorable mentioning SWVI were published: (1) Eastman, J. 
(2013).  “Why Copper, Why Now?” The Motley Fool (February 20); available at 
<http://beta.fool.com/johneastman00/2013/02/20/why-copper-why-now/25077/> & (2) Stocks on Wall Street.  
(2013). “Copper Rally Continues to Give A Buy Signal For These Two Stocks,” Investing.com (February 21 
06:03AM GMT); available at <http://www.investing.com/analysis/copper-rally-continues-to-give-a-buy-signal-for-
these-two-stocks-156137>. 
6
 Available at <http://stockpromoters.com/News-Letters.aspx?symbol=SWVI>. 
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We examined the impact of the frequency of these promotions on stock price and 
volume.  As is often the case in these weak form tests of market efficiency, a comparable 
analysis, this time by stock price, did not yield significant results.  However, the frequency of 
these stock promotions and volume produced precisely the results one might anticipate.  These 
results are summarized in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 provides the results from equation [1a].  We used the natural log of volume of shares 
traded (LnVol) as the dependent variable in our  examination of the impact of the eight sources 
of promotion issued and paid for by SWVI from October 23, 2012, through February 22, 2013. 
LnVoli = 𝛼i + 𝛽1Marketwire1i + 𝛽2PRNewswire2i + 𝛽3Accesswire3i 
+ 𝛽4CanadaNewswire4i + 𝛽5AwesomePennyStocks5i + 𝛽6PennyStockExpert6i 
+ 𝛽7PennyStocks.com7i + 𝛽8VictoryStocks8i + 𝜀i                                                                               [1a] 
  
Multicolinearity resulted in the elimination of PennyStocks.com and VictoryStocks.  
AwesomePennyStocks contributed little to the regression model, was insignificant, and was also 
removed.  (Recall that we reviewed these three and PennyStockExpert for content, and they 
appeared to contain the same or similar content in their headlines and the body of these 
promotional electronic newsletters.)  The result, after eliminating three of the eight newsletters 
and relative event date-based dummy variables, was equation [1b], as follows: 
 
LnVoli = 𝛼i + 𝛽1Marketwire1i + 𝛽2PRNewswire2i + 𝛽3Accesswire3i 
+ 𝛽4CanadaNewswire4i + + 𝛽4PennyStockExpert4i + 𝜀i                                                                    [1b] 
 
 For equation [1b], all four (presumably) independent public relations and/or promotional 
releases are statistically significant at the .05 level, and explain nearly 98% of the variability in 
trading volume for SWVI stock.   
In addition to these promotional newsletters, individuals appear to have been retained to 
tout the stock on stock chat message boards. Table 6 provides a summary of posts made by an 
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alias (Hooka) on a variety of the IHUB stock chat message boards.  In an effort to approximate 
the economic incentives for one to engage in this form of promotional engagement, we identified 
N=27 posts over a 90 minute period.  The self-disclosed compensation was $50, or a bit more 
than $65,000 per year, based on a 40 hour week. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Fundamentals for SWVI – A Nevada Corporation  
SWVI had zero revenues, less than $50,000 in cash and cash equivalents, and a negative 
working capital position. 
From the September 30, 2011, Form 10-Q/A: 
On September 6, 2011, the Company raised $35,000 through the issuance of 
35,000,000 shares of common stock to unrelated parties. 
 
 From the December 31, 2011, Form 10-Q: 
We have not generated positive cash flows from operating activities. The primary 
source of capital has been from the sale of equity securities… 
 
The cost of these shares was $0.0001 per share. In addition 74.1% of the common shares were 
sold to an individual acting as the president, secretary, treasurer, chief financial officer, and sole 
director of SWVI – which is permitted under Nevada corporate law. 
During February 2013,
7
 after a series of positive news releases and/or advertisements, 
SWVI reached a 52-week high of $1.00 per share.  This high represents a 10,000% increase from 
the cost of $0.0001 per share.  Alternatively, consider that a $1,000 investment was valued at as 
much as $10 million during February 2013, less than 18 months after acquisition. 
                                                          
7
 It is, sometimes, helpful or insightful to actually trade some small amount of money to examine the liquidity of 
these stocks.  In the case of SWVI, one of the authors purchased some shares on February 8 and 11 and sold these 
shares on February 12 for a tiny, round-trip profit.   Both buy and sell executions appeared to be efficient and there 
was no evidence of any lack of liquidity or front-running. 
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From the December 31, 2012, Form 10-Q: 
 
(SWVI)…was incorporated in the state of Nevada on June 24, 2010, as a 
development stage company with the a principal business objective of selling 
men’s and women’s golf apparel…(o)n August 22, 2012, the Company went 
through a change in control and management…(o)n October 15, 2012, the 
Company entered into an assignment agreement with Mid Americas…whereby 
Mid Americas has the rights to acquire 75% of certain mining concessions in 
Chile…. 
 
  
This quote from the 10-Q not only establishes SWVI as a Nevada firm, but also shows a 
rather abrupt change in business model from a golf apparel company to one dealing in 
Chilean mining concessions.  This puzzling conversion raises some suspicion as to the 
legitimacy of SWVI’s business.  This information, though publically available, seemed to 
have been largely ignored by investors as the stock price soared.  As of the end of the 
third quarter of 2013 (September 30), SWVI was trading at $0.01 per share. 
 In the next section we examine a comparable Delaware corporation for 
comparison and contrast. 
Fundamentals for CYIG – A Delaware Corporation 
 
Stock promoters rely on the retention of their subscribers to sell their services.  To do 
this, they remind subscribers of their successes.  While aggregate compensation measures were 
not available for Awesome Penny Stocks, in the case of the SWVI promotion (a Nevada 
corporation), they were available for TribecaInvestments, Ltd., involved in the March 3, 2012, 
promotion for China YCT International Group, Inc. or CYIG (a Delaware corporation).  They 
pre-empted this promotion with a reminder: 
So far this year we've had some amazing alerts with stocks seeing gains of 
+6,122%, +1,039%, & +570%. Now we've also had some alerts that haven't been 
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as impressive, but that is all part of trying (sic) to alert you to companies that 
present actionable opportunities for you to secure trading profits. 
 
Table 7 provides the self-disclosed promotional revenues reported by TribecaInvestments, Ltd., 
which we have partitioned into both Nevada and Other corporations.  Table 7 reveals that 61% of 
their revenues originate from the promotion of firms incorporated in the state of Nevada.  This 
again represents a disproportionally large amount relative to the total number of US firms 
incorporated in Nevada. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 CYIG is a comparable company to SWVI, in the sense that they are both micro-cap 
stocks that hired firms to promote their shares.  While the evidence may only be anecdotal, the 
fundamentals of the Delaware incorporated CYIG are in sharp contrast to those of SWVI.  In 
March 2012 CYIG filed a 10-Q with the SEC that contained unaudited financials with a positive 
working capital position, positive net assets and equity, and positive net earnings per share.   
 The opening stock price on the Monday following the weekend promotion for CYIG 
gapped up from $0.003 per share to $0.30 per share, hitting a high price per share of $2.84, or 
nearly a 95,000% increase in a single trading day.  CYIG had an unaudited book value of $1.86 
per share, positive working capital, little or no debt, and favorable earnings per share measures.  
It was, of course, not possible to purchase the share at the $0.003 price over the weekend 
promotion.  However, the firm’s 10-Q, providing the firm’s balance sheet and favorable 
fundamental measures, were publicly available.  It had been filed two weeks prior to the 
promotional announcement. 
 As of the end of the third quarter of 2013 (September 30), CYIG was trading at $0.24 per 
share – a fraction of the firm’s liquidation value.  Ultimately the story of CYIG was very similar 
to that of SWVI, despite the stark contrast in their financial fundamentals.  This lends even 
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further credence to Christensen’s (2010) argument regarding the importance of non-fundamental 
information from unregulated sources. Although no regulatory action has commenced on either 
company, the classic pump and dump schemes of SWVI lend anecdotal support to the Nevada 
Effect. 
 
SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF OUR FORENSIC INVESTIGATIONS: 
SEC AND DOJ, FBI AND IRS ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND OUR EXTENSIONS 
 
We use Table 8 to summarize and present the results of our forensic examination of the 
Nevada effect. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
We have examined the June 2011, SEC trading suspensions for 17 corporations (Table 1) 
and the results from a combined effort conducted by the DOJ, FBI and IRS; which was 
announced in a February 2013 press release (Table 2).  In both cases, Nevada corporations were 
over-represented and Delaware corporations were either under-represented or not represented. 
These results support the contemporary persistence of the Nevada Effect. 
 We chronicle the steps taken in our forensic examination, which identified far more 
dramatic Nevada corporation over-representations, based on publically available information 
during February and March 2013.  The Seeking Alpha article (Table 3 and Figure 2), a penny 
stock monitoring website, Penny Stock Promotions (Table 4), and a public disclosure of the 
source of revenues for a stock promoter, TribecaInvestments, Inc. (Table 7), all suggest that 
Nevada is leading Delaware and other states in attracting effective and profitable stock 
promoters and promotional efforts (Tables 5 and 6).  Figure 3 – developed by Appendices A and 
B – illustrates the market share increases enjoyed by Nevada, perhaps to Delaware’s detriment 
when focusing on 2008-2011 Compustat data. 
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 Both SWVI (Nevada) and CYIG (Delaware) engaged stock promoters and experienced 
dramatic stock price increases during late February and early March, 2013.  At the end of the 
2013 calendar year, SWVI was trading at less than $0.02 per share (from a 52-week high of 
$1.00 per share) and CYIG was trading at $0.40 per share (from a 52-week high of $2.84 per 
share).  These mini-cases were not selected randomly.  They were selected to illustrate the very 
significant stock promotional outcomes that can be achieved.  In the case of SWVI, a Nevada 
corporation, the promotional activity appears to represent what stock traders and the SEC 
characterizes as a pump and dump.  While promoted, CYIG, a Delaware corporation, does not 
appear to have been a pump and dump.  Regulators and academic researchers may find these 
mini-cases helpful when designing research methodologies to further investigate the Nevada 
Effect. 
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Table 1 
SEC Trading Suspension for 17 Companies 
June 7, 2011 
 
Firm Name8 NV DE 
   1-American Pacific Rim Commerce Group is a California corporation based in Florida. 0 0 
   2-Anywhere MD, Inc. is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in California. 1 0 
   3-Calypso Wireless, Inc. is a Delaware corporation based in Texas. 0 1 
   4-Cascadia Investments, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Washington State. 1 0 
   5-CytoGenix, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Texas. 1 0 
   6-Emerging Healthcare Solutions, Inc. is a Wyoming corporation based in Texas. 0 0 
   7-Evolution Solar Corporation is a Colorado corporation based in Arizona. 0 0 
   8-Global Resource Corporation is a Nevada corporation based in North Carolina. 1 0 
   9-Go Solar USA, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Louisiana. 1 0 
10-Kore Nutrition, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Nevada. 1 0 
11-Laidlaw Energy Group, Inc. is a New York corporation based in New York. 0 0 
12-Mind Technologies, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in California. 1 0 
13-Montvale Technologies, Inc. is a New Jersey corporation based in New Jersey. 0 0 
14-MSGI Technology Solutions, Inc. (f/k/a MSGI Security Solutions, Inc.) is a Nevada corporation based in New York. 1 0 
15-Prime Star Group, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Nevada. 1 0 
16-Solar Park Initiatives, Inc. is a Nevada corporation based in Florida. 1 0 
17-United States Oil & Gas Corporation is a Delaware corporation based in Texas. 0 1 
Totals Incorporated in Nevada & Delaware 10 2 
Percentage Incorporated in Nevada & Delaware 59% 12% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8
 The state of operation is underlined, where n=2 of the N=10 of the firms incorporated in the state of Nevada are 
actually operating or have their principal place of business in the state of Nevada. 
Journal of Forensic & Investigative Accounting 
Vol. 7, Issue 2, July - December, 2015 
327 
 
 
Table 2 
Jurisdiction or State of Fraudulent Inflated Stock Values 
U.S. Attorney’s Office – Central District of California 
Illegal Proceeds, Specified by Identifiable Jurisdiction or State 
February 14, 2013 Press Release 
 
 
Jurisdiction Illegal Proceeds 
Firm9 or State10 (millions) 
  1-FrogAds NV $6.8 
  2-GenMed NV $2.1 
  3-Empire Post Media NV $1.0 
  4-Sport Endurance NV $1.0 
  5-Biostem NV $0.5 
  6-Calbridge Capital LLC NV unspecified 
  7-Imobolis, Inc. NV unspecified 
  8-Apache Capital LLC FL unspecified 
  9-Big Dog International LLC FL unspecified 
10-London Finance Group, Ltd. unknown unspecified 
11-8 Sounds, Inc. unknown unspecified 
12-ScrIpted Consulting Group unknown unspecified 
13-Taylor Financial, Ltd. unknown unspecified 
Total Identified as NV Corporations 
 
$11.4 
Total Identified  $30.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 The names of firms in the article were imprecise.  FrogAds is FrogAds, Incorporated, GenMed is Genmed Holding 
Corporation, Empire Post Media is Empire Post Media, Incorporated, Sport Endurance is Sport Endurance, 
Incorporated, and Biostem is Biostem U.S. Corporation, based in Clearwater, Florida. 
10
 If Internet searches failed to reveal any information on these firms with respect to state of incorporation, they are 
listed as “unknown.” 
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Table 3 
Jurisdiction or State of Firms Examined by the Fraud Research Institute 
Seeking Alpha Article 
February 20, 2013 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
Firm or State 
   1-Swingplane Ventures, Incorporated*11 NV 
   2-Tapslide, Incorporated12 NV 
   3-PaperFree Medical Solutions, Incorporated13 NV 
   4-TheraBiogen NV 
   5-Xpention Genetics, Incorporated14 NV 
   6-HS3 Technologies, Incorporated15 NV 
   7-World Moto, Incorporated* NV 
   8-TagLikeMe Corporation* NV 
   9-Superior Venture* NV 
10-Amwest Imaging, Incorporated* NV 
11-USA Graphite, Incorporated NV 
12-Kushi Resources16 CO 
13-Great Wall Builders, Limited* TX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 When incorporated on June 24, 2010, Matthew Ryan Diehl was the company’s sole Officer and Director. 
12
 Matthew Diehl formerly acted as Chief Operating Officer and Director.  This stock was suspended by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission from trading on January 19, 2012, for a lack of current and accurate 
information. 
13
 Matthew Diehl was formerly employed as the Chief Executive Officer. 
14
 Aaron Lamkin, an associate (and roommate) of Matthew Diehl, was barred by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on November 16, 2011, and can no longer be associated by a registered broker or dealer, for the 
unregistered distribution of shares. 
15
 Aaron Lamkin, an associate (and roommate) of Matthew Diehl, was barred by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission on November 16, 2011, and can no longer be associated by a registered broker or dealer, for the 
unregistered distribution of shares. 
16
 Matthew Diehl was a former Officer and Director. 
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* These firms engaged Awesome Penny Stocks, a stock promoter. 
Table 4 
Most Promoted Penny Stocks 
Ticker Symbol, Specified by Identifiable Jurisdiction or State 
Week Ending February 22, 2013 
 
8 of the Top 10 are Nevada Corporations 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
Firm or State Newsletters 
   1-HVYW NV 122 
   2-SWVI NV 83 
   3-XCHC NV 83 
   4-OPIX NV 69 
   5-FUEG FL 56 
   6-CNCT FL 46 
   7-GRPH NV 43 
   8-ACGX NV 40 
   9-RARS NV 40 
10-GVIT NV 39 
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Table 5 
Results of Equation [1b] from the Examination of Stock Trading Volume 
and the Source and Frequency of News Releases and News Wires for SWVI 
October 23, 2012 through February 22, 2013 
 
Regression Results 
 
Description N coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Intercept 
 
0.9881 2.46 0.016 
 
Marketwire 49 1.5059 2.97 0.004 
 
PRNewswire 14 4.2797 4.57 0.000 
 
CanadaNewswire 1 -7.7160 -2.17 0.033 
 
PennyStockExpert 19 11.1570 9.71 0.000 
 
      
Overall F-statistic 
    
82.7 
Adjusted R-squared 
    
97.8 
 
 
 
Pearson Correlation Results
17
 
 
 
PRNewswire Accesswire CanadaNewswire AwesomePennyStocks PennyStockExpert PennyStocks.com VictoryStocks 
Marketwire 0.540 0.369 0.143* 0.654 0.679 0.679 0.679 
PRNewswire 
 
0.463 0.416  0.297 0.281 0.281 0.281 
Accesswire 
  
-0.022* 0.211 0.201 0.201 0.201 
CanadaNewswire 
   
0.210 0.202 0.202 0.202 
AwesomePennyStocks 
    
0.966 0.966 0.966 
PennyStockExpert 
     
1.000** 1.000** 
PennyStocks.com 
      
1.000** 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 *Not significant at the .10 level.  **Perfectly Collinear. 
 It is not uncommon for these thinly traded micro caps to react favorably to promotional campaigns – in this 
case, an extraordinarily well-executed one.  It is not possible to examine the price per share for this firm, in any 
meaningful manner, since there are no earnings and trading or selling into these promotionally-developed rallies is 
sub-optimal.  There are no fundamental measures likely to provide any explanatory power.  It is for this reason that 
we focused on volume-based measures and use a volume-based transform.  If we replace the natural log of the 
volume for SWVI with that for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, for example, the same set of independent 
variables produce an R-squared measure of 0.0% and all independent variables are insignificant at the 30 percent 
level. 
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Table 6 
SWVI Posts by Hooka and on the IHUB Stock Chat Message Board 
February 25, 2013 
 
 Posts by Hooka Board Date/Time 
1- SWVI .7251 +9% Momentum Players 11:03:54 AM 
2- SWVI .7251 +9% Swingplane Ventures Inc (SWVI) 11:03:42 AM 
3- SWVI - Copper Rally Continues To Give A MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 11:02:30 AM 
4- Investing.com has new Article about SWVI - http://www.investing.com/analy STOCKGOODIES PLAYS OF THE WEEK 11:01:30 AM 
5- Investing.com has new Article about SWVI - http://www.investing.com/analy BB's Stock Haven 10:59:58 AM 
6- SWVI - Why Copper, Why Now? Momentum Players 10:58:48 AM 
7- SWVI - Why Copper, Why Now? Penny Stock Millionaire 10:58:21 AM 
8- SWVI - 4 Metal Stocks To Buy On MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 10:57:15 AM 
9- SWVI - 4 Metal Stocks To Buy On .0001 PICKS ONLY 10:56:50 AM 
10- SWVI - As it pushes to evaluate the Swingplane Ventures Inc (SWVI) 10:56:11 AM 
11- SWVI - As it pushes to evaluate the Stock Legends 10:55:51 AM 
12- $SWVI - Company officials admit that production is BB's Stock Haven 10:55:19 AM 
13- $SWVI - Company officials admit that production is MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 10:55:08 AM 
14- $SWVI - Trading as a pink sheet stock, Momentum Players 10:27:28 AM 
15- $SWVI - Demand for copper is falling, but Money Runners 10:26:51 AM 
16- $SWVI - Demand for copper is falling, but MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 10:26:37 AM 
17- SWVI - This Company Has Copper Mining On The Hunt for the Next 10 Bagger 10:24:55 AM 
18- $SWVI - Copper is found in many places STOCKGOODIES PLAYS OF THE WEEK 10:23:52 AM 
19- $SWVI - Copper is found in many places Swingplane Ventures Inc (SWVI) 10:23:36 AM 
20- SWVI - Copper prices have rallied over the BB's Stock Haven 10:23:04 AM 
21- SWVI - Copper prices have rallied over the MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 10:22:44 AM 
22- SWVI….. Copper Rally Continues To Give A Buy Swingplane Ventures Inc (SWVI) 9:55:34 AM 
23- SWVI….. Copper Rally Continues To Give A Buy STOCKGOODIES PLAYS OF THE WEEK 9:55:04 AM 
24- SWVI….. Copper Rally Continues To Give A Buy BB's Stock Haven 9:36:01 AM 
25- Huge Article about SWVI Swingplane Ventures Inc (SWVI) 9:34:52 AM 
26- Huge Article about SWVI BB's Stock Haven 9:32:29 AM 
27- Huge Article about SWVI MOMO'S BREAKOUT BOARD 9:31:54 AM 
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Table 7 
Self-Reported Promotional Campaign Revenues for TribecaInvestments, Ltd. 
Nevada (NV) and Other States of Incorporation 
10 Month Period through February 2013 
 
       
NV Other 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for OREO by a third party, Winning Media. (4/15/2012 - 4/27/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for AEDC by a third party, Winning Media. (4/24/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for RACK by a third party, Winning Media. (5/6/2012) 
 
$40,000 $0 
$50,000 Up to $50,000 for PFNI by a third party, Winning Media. (5/8/2012) 
 
$50,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for BRFH by a third party, Winning Media. (5/13/2012) $0 $40,000 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for ORYN by a third party, Winning Media. (5/27/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for LBGO by a third party, Winning Media. (6/17/2012) $0 $40,000 
$50,000 Up to $50,000 for IMUN by a third party, Winning Media. (7/31/2012) $0 $50,000 
$50,000 Up to $50,000 for TNIB by a third party, Winning Media. (8/7/2012) 
 
$0 $50,000 
$45,000 Up to $45,000 for FUEG by a third party, Winning Media. (9/4/2012) 
 
$0 $45,000 
$42,500 Up to $42,500 for LBGO by a third party, Winning Media. (9/5/2012) 
 
$0 $42,500 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for SEFE by a third party, Winning Media. (9/11/2012) 
 
$40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for ORYN by a third party, Winning Media. (9/16/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for CHMR by a third party, Winning Media. (9/19/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for GNGR by a third party, Winning Media. (9/26/2012) $0 $40,000 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for LBGO by a third party, Winning Media. (10/01/2012) $0 $40,000 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for ORYN by a third party, Winning Media. (10/14/2012) $40,000 $0 
$40,000 Up to $40,000 for GRST by a third party, Winning Media. (10/18/2012) $0 $40,000 
$35,000 Up to $35,000 for CUAU by a third party, Winning Media. (10/28/2012) $35,000 $0 
$30,000 Up to $30,000 for AVXL by a third party, Winning Media. (11/05/2012) $30,000 $0 
$30,000 Up to $30,000 for FSTC by a third party, Winning Media. (11/13/2012) $0 $30,000 
$25,000 Up to $25,000 for IMUN by a third party, Winning Media. (11/27/2012) $0 $25,000 
$30,000 Up to $30,000 for URBF by a third party, Winning Media. (1/13/2013) $30,000 $0 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for ZPPB by a third party, Winning Media. (1/22/2013) $60,000 $0 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for CWNM by a third party, Winning Media. (1/23/2013) $60,000 $0 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for ITNS by a third party, Winning Media. (1/29/2013) 
 
$60,000 $0 
$65,000 Up to $65,000 for HKTU by a third party, Winning Media. (2/3/2013) 
 
$0 $65,000 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for PMCM by a third party, Winning Media. (2/7/2013) $0 $60,000 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for BFLD by a third party, Winning Media. (2/10/2013) $60,000 $0 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for RARS by a third party, Winning Media. (2/19/2013) $60,000 $0 
$60,000 Up to $60,000 for GRPH by a third party, Winning Media. (2/20/2013) $60,000 $0 
$50,000 Up to $50,000 for USTU by a third party, Winning Media. (2/26/2013) $50,000 $0 
$1,442,500 
      
$875,000 $567,500 
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Percent of total revenues 
    
61% 39% 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Nevada (NV) versus Delaware (DE) Percentage Comparisons 
Selected Summary, Back-Tested, and Extended Measures 
 
 
NV DE Year Description 
Regulatory Enforcements 
    
Table 1 59% 12% 2011 June 7 SEC Trading Suspensions for 17 Corporations 
Table 2 54% 0% 2013 February 14 DOJ-FBI-IRS Press Release 
     
Supplemental 
    
Table 3 & Figure 2 85% 0% 2013 February 20 Seeking Alpha Article 
Table 4 80% 0% 2013 February 22 Penny Stock Promotions 
Table 7 61% 0% 2013 March 3 Promotional Revenues self-reported by TribecaInvestments, Ltd. 
     
1993 through 2008     
Appendix A 5% 54%  Mean measures for Nevada and Delaware 
     
2008 through 2011 Trend     
Figure 3 7.0% 56.0% 2008 Market Share from Compustat 
Figure 3 7.4% 55.6% 2009 Market Share from Compustat 
Figure 3 8.1% 55.0% 2010 Market Share from Compustat 
Figure 3 & Appendix A & B 8.3% 54.3% 2011 Market Share from Compustat 
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Figure 1 
Information Asymmetry: 
Mapping Agency Theory to Market Efficiency 
As adapted from Cataldo 
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Figure 2 
Fraud Research Institute – Seeking Alpha Article - February 20, 2013 
January 24 through February 21, 2013 
Daily Stock Price Trading Ranges for SWVI 
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Figure 3 
Delaware and Nevada Market Share Trend – Percentage Increase 
Compustat - 1987 through 2011 (1987 base year) 
Developed from Appendix A & B 
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Appendix A 
Nevada (NV), Delaware (DE) and Combined Market Share 
Compustat 
 
Year NV DE NV & DE 
1987 2.9% 46.9% 49.9% 
1988 3.0% 47.7% 50.7% 
1989 3.1% 48.7% 51.8% 
1990 3.0% 49.8% 52.8% 
1991 3.0% 50.7% 53.7% 
1992 3.1% 51.8% 55.0% 
1993 3.1% 50.4% 53.5% 
1994 3.0% 51.2% 54.2% 
1995 3.0% 52.8% 55.8% 
1996 3.0% 53.6% 56.6% 
1997 3.0% 54.2% 57.3% 
1998 3.1% 55.8% 59.0% 
1999 4.6% 54.5% 59.1% 
2000 5.5% 54.2% 59.7% 
2001 6.0% 53.9% 59.9% 
2002 5.9% 54.4% 60.3% 
2003 6.2% 54.5% 60.7% 
2004 6.2% 54.8% 61.0% 
2005 6.1% 55.5% 61.6% 
2006 6.3% 55.6% 61.9% 
2007 7.0% 55.8% 62.8% 
2008 7.0% 56.0% 63.0% 
2009 7.4% 55.6% 63.0% 
2010 8.1% 55.0% 63.1% 
2011 8.3% 54.3% 62.6% 
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Appendix B 
Corporations in the Compustat Database by State or Jurisdiction for Fiscal Year 2011 
(including Foreign countries and U.S. Only) 
 
State of 
Incorporation 
(including Foreign) 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Percent 
of Total 
  
State of 
Incorporation 
(U.S. Only) 
Number 
of 
Firms 
Percent 
of Total 
1 AK 4 0.06% 
 
1 AK 4 0.07% 
2 AL 7 0.11% 
 
2 AL 7 0.13% 
3 AR 8 0.12% 
 
3 AR 8 0.15% 
4 AZ 10 0.15% 
 
4 AZ 10 0.19% 
5 CA 121 1.87% 
 
5 CA 121 2.24% 
6 CO 61 0.94% 
 
6 CO 61 1.13% 
7 CT 21 0.32% 
 
7 CT 21 0.39% 
8 DC 7 0.11% 
 
-    
9 DE 2,928 45.21% 
 
8 DE 2,928 54.26% 
10 Foreign 1,081 16.69% 
 
-    
11 FL 109 1.68% 
 
9 FL 109 2.02% 
12 GA 48 0.74% 
 
10 GA 48 0.89% 
13 GU 1 0.02% 
 
-    
14 HI 6 0.09% 
 
11 HI 6 0.11% 
15 IA 18 0.28% 
 
12 IA 18 0.33% 
16 ID 7 0.11% 
 
13 ID 7 0.13% 
17 IL 23 0.36% 
 
14 IL 23 0.43% 
18 IN 60 0.93% 
 
15 IN 60 1.11% 
19 KS 10 0.15% 
 
16 KS 10 0.19% 
20 KY 18 0.28% 
 
17 KY 18 0.33% 
21 LA 19 0.29% 
 
18 LA 19 0.35% 
22 MA 57 0.88% 
 
19 MA 57 1.06% 
23 MD 283 4.37% 
 
20 MD 283 5.24% 
24 ME 7 0.11% 
 
21 ME 7 0.13% 
25 MI 52 0.80% 
 
22 MI 52 0.96% 
26 MN 87 1.34% 
 
23 MN 87 1.61% 
27 MO 38 0.59% 
 
24 MO 38 0.70% 
28 MS 12 0.19% 
 
25 MS 12 0.22% 
29 MT 6 0.09% 
 
26 MT 6 0.11% 
30 NC 41 0.63% 
 
27 NC 41 0.76% 
31 ND 4 0.06% 
 
28 ND 4 0.07% 
32 NE 6 0.09% 
 
29 NE 6 0.11% 
33 NH 2 0.03% 
 
30 NH 2 0.04% 
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34 NJ 61 0.94% 
 
31 NJ 61 1.13% 
35 NM 3 0.05% 
 
32 NM 3 0.06% 
36 NV 450 6.95% 
 
33 NV 450 8.34% 
37 NY 136 2.10% 
 
34 NY 136 2.52% 
38 OH 114 1.76% 
 
35 OH 114 2.11% 
39 OK 19 0.29% 
 
36 OK 19 0.35% 
40 OR 36 0.56% 
 
37 OR 36 0.67% 
41 PA 121 1.87% 
 
38 PA 121 2.24% 
42 PR 4 0.06% 
 
-    
43 RI 6 0.09% 
 
39 RI 6 0.11% 
44 SC 18 0.28% 
 
40 SC 18 0.33% 
45 SD 4 0.06% 
 
41 SD 4 0.07% 
46 TN 24 0.37% 
 
42 TN 24 0.44% 
47 TX 93 1.44% 
 
43 TX 93 1.72% 
48 UT 27 0.42% 
 
44 UT 27 0.50% 
49 VA 81 1.25% 
 
45 VA 81 1.50% 
50 VT 1 0.02% 
 
46 VT 1 0.02% 
51 WA 53 0.82% 
 
47 WA 53 0.98% 
52 WI 52 0.80% 
 
48 WI 52 0.96% 
53 WV 7 0.11% 
 
49 WV 7 0.13% 
54 WY 5 0.08% 
 
50 WY 5 0.09% 
 
Total 6,477 100.00% 
  
Total 5,396 100.00% 
